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In recent years, many central banks, including the Bank of England, have placed increased emphasis on price stability. Monetary policy-whether expressed in terms of interest rates or growth of monetary aggregates-has been increasingly geared toward the achievement of low and stable inflation. As one indicator of this concern, the Bank of England began in February 1993 to issue the Inflation Report.
Central bankers and most other observers view price stability as a worthy objective because they think that inflation is costly. Some of these costs involve the average rate of inflation, and others relate to the variability and uncertainty of inflation. But the general idea is that businesses and households are thought to perform poorly when inflation is high and unpredictable.
The academic literature contains a lot of theoretical work on the costs of inflation; a thorough review by Briault (1995) appeared in the February issue of the Bulletin. This analysis provides a presumption that inflation is a bad idea, but the case is not decisive without supporting empirical findings. Although some empirical results (also surveyed by Briault) suggest that inflation is harmful, the evidence is not overwhelming. It is therefore important to carry out additional empirical research on the relation between inflation and economic performance. This article explores this relation in a large sample of countries over the last 30 years.
Data
The data set covers over 100 countries from 1960 to 1990. Table A provides information about the behaviour of inflation in this sample. Annual inflation rates were computed in most cases from consumer price indices. (The deflator for the gross domestic product was used in a few instances, when the data on consumer prices were unavailable.) The table shows the mean and median across the countries of the inflation rates in three decades: 1960-70, 1970-80 and 1980-90 . The median inflation rate was 3.3% per year in the 1960s (117 countries), 10.1% in the 1970s (122 countries) and 8.9% in the 1980s (119 countries). (3) The annual data were used for each country over each decade to compute a measure of inflation variability, the standard deviation of the inflation rate around its decadal mean. Table A shows the mean and median of these standard deviations for the three decades. The median was 2.4% per year in the 1960s, 5.4% in the 1970s and 4.9% in the 1980s. Thus, a rise in inflation variability accompanied the increase in the average inflation rate since the 1960s.
(1) Robert Barro is Robert C Waggoner Professor of Economics at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University.
(2) The Houblon-Norman Fund, established by the Bank in 1944, finances academic research into subjects relevant to central banking. More details of the Fund were given in an article in the August 1993 Quarterly Bulletin. The author acknowledges useful comments from Clive Briault and Tony Garratt, and help with the inflation data from Simon Frew, of the Bank's Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division. (3) The cross-country mean of inflation exceeds the median for each decade because the distribution of inflation rates is highly skewed to the right, as shown in Charts 1-3; that is, there are a number of outliers with positive inflation rates of large magnitude, but none with negative inflation rates of high magnitude. Because this skewness increased in the 1980s (there were more countries with very high inflation rates), the mean inflation rate rose from the 1970s to the 1980s, although the median rate declined.
Charts 1-3 provide information about the distribution of inflation rates across the countries in the three decades. To ease the presentation, the upper panel considers inflation rates below 25% per year, whereas the lower panel looks at the entire range. Aside from the clustering of inflation rates around the median for each decade, the charts show the outlier countries with extremely high inflation rates (see footnote 3). Charts 4-6 provide the parallel information Summers and Heston (1993) . For the 1985-90 period, some of the figures come from the World Bank (and are based on market exchange rates rather than purchasing-power comparisons). The ratios of real investment (private plus public) to real GDP come from Summers and Heston (1993) . These values are averages for 1960-69, 1970-79 and 1980-89. 
Chart 1 Distribution of inflation rates across countries: 1960-70
Number of countries (a) For those countries whose average inflation rate was less than 25% per year.
(a) For those countries whose average inflation rate was less than 25% per year. about the cross-country distribution of the decadal standard deviations of inflation. In these cases, the upper panels consider only standard deviations below 15% per year, whereas the lower panels examine the full range. Number of countries (a) For those countries whose average standard deviation of inflation rate was less than 15% per year.
(a) For those countries whose average standard deviation of inflation rate was less than 15% per year.
(a) For those countries whose average standard deviation of inflation rate was less than 15% per year. (a) For those countries whose average inflation rate was less than 25% per year.
Chart
Charts 7-9 confirm the well-known view that a higher variability of inflation tends to accompany a higher average rate of inflation [see, for example, Okun (1971) and Logue and Willett (1976) ]. These charts provide scatter plots for each decade of the standard deviation of inflation (measured for each country around its own decadal mean) against the average inflation rate (the mean of each country's inflation rate over the decade). The upper panels of each chart consider only inflation rates below 25% per year, whereas the lower panels look at the entire range. The positive relation between variability and mean is apparent throughout, but is stronger in the plots that include the full range of inflation rates. 
Framework for the analysis of growth
To assess the effect of inflation on economic growth, I use a system of regression equations in which many other determinants of growth are held constant. The framework is one that I have developed and applied previously. (1) A general notion in the framework is that an array of government policies and private-sector choices determine where an economy will go in the long run. For example, favourable public policies-including better maintenance of the rule of law and property rights, fewer distortions of private markets, less non-productive government consumption and greater public investment in high-return areas-lead in the long run to higher levels of real per capita GDP. (Henceforth, the term GDP will be used as a shorthand to denote real per capita GDP.) Similarly, a greater willingness of the private sector to save and a reduced tendency to expend resources on child-rearing (lower fertility and population growth) tend to raise standards of living in the long run.
Given the determinants of the long-run position, an economy tends currently to grow faster the lower its GDP. In other words, an economy's per capita growth rate is increasing in the gap between its long-term prospective GDP and its current GDP. This force generates a convergence tendency, in which poor countries grow faster than rich countries and tend thereby to catch up in a proportional sense to the rich places. However, poor countries grow quickly only if they have favourable settings for government policies and private-sector choices. If a poor country selects unfavourable policies-a choice that likely explains why the country is currently observed to be poor-then its growth rate will not be high and it will not tend to catch up to the richer places.
Chart 8 Standard deviation of inflation versus inflation rate: 1970-80
Standard (a) For those countries whose average inflation rate was less than 25% per year.
(1) See Barro (1991 Barro ( , 1994 ), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 12).
Another important element is a country's human capital in the forms of education and health. For given values of prospective and actual GDP, a country grows faster-that is, approaches its long-run position more rapidly-the greater its current level of human capital. This effect arises because first physical capital tends to expand rapidly to match a high endowment of human capital, and second a country with more human capital is better equipped to acquire and adapt the efficient technologies that have been developed in the leading countries. (1) (This sample reflects the availability of the necessary data.) The details for a similar set-up appear in Barro (1994) .
Estimated effects of inflation on economic growth Preliminary results
To get a first-pass estimate of the effect of inflation on economic growth, I included the inflation rate over each period as an explanatory variable along with the growth determinants described in Table B . Section A of Table C indicates that the estimated coefficient of inflation is -0.024 (standard error = 0.005). Thus, an increase of ten percentage points in the annual inflation rate is associated with a decline of 0.24 percentage points in the annual growth rate of GDP. Since the t-statistic for the estimated coefficient is 4.9, this result is statistically significant. (2) Chart 10 depicts graphically the relation between growth and inflation. The horizontal axis shows the inflation rate; each observation corresponds to the average rate for a particular country over one of the time periods considered (1965-75, 1975-85 and 1985-90) . The top panel in the chart considers inflation rates below 10% per year, whereas the bottom panel includes the full range of inflation. The vertical axis shows the growth rate of GDP net of the part of the growth rate that is explained by all of the explanatory variables aside from the inflation rate. (3) Thus, the panels illustrate the relation between growth and inflation after all of the other growth determinants have been held constant.
The bottom panel of Chart 10 fits a downward-sloping regression line (least-squares line) through the scatter plot; the slope of this line corresponds to the significantly
(1) The first period starts in 1965, rather than 1960, so that the estimation procedure can use lagged values of the various explanatory variables.
(2) This estimate is similar to that reported by Fischer (1993, Table 9 ). For earlier estimates of inflation variables in cross-country regressions, see Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989) . (3) The residual is computed from the regression system that includes all of the variables, including the inflation rate. But the contribution from the inflation rate is left out to compute the variable on the vertical axis in the scatter diagram. Barro (1994) . (a) The numbers in italics are standard errors for the estimated effects of inflation on the growth rate of real per capita GDP. The estimates come from the systems described in Table B .
Chart 10 Growth rate of real per capita GDP (part unexplained by other variables) and inflation rate (a) For those countries whose average inflation rate was less than 10% per year.
negative coefficient shown in Section A of The standard deviation of inflation can be added to the system to see whether inflation variability has a relation with growth when the average inflation rate is held constant. The strong positive correlation between the mean and variability of inflation (Charts 7-9) suggests that it would be difficult to distinguish the influences of these two aspects of inflation. However, when the two variables are entered jointly into the regression system, the estimated coefficient on inflation remains similar to that found before [-0.021 (standard error = 0.008)], and the estimated coefficient on the standard deviation of inflation is virtually zero [-0.004 (0.009)]. Thus, for a given average rate of inflation, the variability of inflation has no significant relation with growth.
The nature of the relationship between the growth rate and the standard deviation of inflation is depicted in Chart 11. In this construction, the vertical axis plots the growth rate of GDP after allowing for the contributions of the other explanatory variables, including the average rate of inflation. The two panels in the chart show that the lack of relationship applies over the full range of experience. One possible interpretation of this surprising result is that the variability of inflation does not adequately measure the uncertainty of inflation, the variable that one would have expected to be negatively related to growth.
Instrumental variables for inflation
A key problem in the interpretation of the results is that they need not reflect causation from inflation to growth. Inflation is an endogenous variable, which may respond to growth or to other variables that are related to growth. For example, an inverse relation between growth and inflation would arise if an exogenous slowing of the growth rate tended to generate higher inflation. This increase in inflation could result if monetary authorities reacted to economic slowdowns with expansionary policies. Moreover, if the path of monetary aggregates did not change, then a reduction in the growth rate of output would tend automatically to raise the inflation rate (to be consistent with the equality between money supply and demand at each point in time).
It is also possible that the endogeneity of inflation would produce a positive relation between inflation and growth. This pattern tends to emerge if output fluctuations are driven primarily by shocks to money or to the aggregate demand for goods.
Another possibility is that some omitted third variable is correlated with growth and inflation. For example, better enforcement of property rights is likely to spur investment and growth, and is also likely to accompany a rules-based set-up in which the monetary authority generates a lower average rate of inflation. The idea is that a committed monetary policy represents the application of the rule of law to the behaviour of the monetary authority. Some of the explanatory variables in the system attempt to capture the degree of maintenance of the rule of law. However, to the extent that these measures are imperfect, the inflation rate
(1) The p-value for the hypothesis of equal coefficients is 0.65.
Chart 11
Growth rate of real per capita GDP (part unexplained by other variables) and standard deviation of inflation may proxy inversely for the rule of law and thereby show up as a negative influence on growth. The estimated coefficient on the inflation rate could therefore reflect an effect on growth that has nothing to do with inflation per se.
In general, the way to avoid these difficulties is to isolate relatively exogenous variations in inflation; that is, to use the data to try to mimic the results from experiments in which inflation is set arbitrarily at different values. The implementation of this idea requires satisfactory instrumental variables-reasonably exogenous variables that are themselves significantly related to inflation. If these instrumental variables can be found, then one can investigate whether the changes in inflation that are related to the instruments (and are, accordingly, exogenous) still have the kind of negative relation with growth that appears in Chart 10.
Central bank independence
One promising source of instruments for inflation involves legal provisions that guarantee more or less central bank independence. A recent literature (1) argues that a greater degree of independence leads to lower average rates of money growth and inflation, and to greater monetary stability. The idea is that independence enhances the ability of the central bank to commit to price stability and, hence, to deliver low and stable inflation. Alesina and Summers (1993, Figures 1a, 1b) find striking negative relationships among 16 developed countries from 1955 to 1988 between an index of the degree of central bank independence and the mean and variance of inflation. Thus, in this sample, the measure of central bank independence satisfies one condition needed for a good inflation instrument; it has substantial explanatory power for inflation.
Because of the difficulty of enacting changes in laws, it is plausible that a good deal of the cross-country differences in legal provisions that influence central bank independence can be treated as exogenous. Problems arise, however, if the legal framework changes in response to inflation (although the sign of this interaction is unclear). In addition, exogeneity would be violated if alterations in a country's legal environment for monetary policy are correlated with changes in unmeasured institutional features-such as structures that maintain property rights-that influence growth rates. This problem is, however, mitigated by the inclusion of other explanatory variables, notably the index of the rule of law, in the regression framework.
Cukierman (1992, Chapter 19) argues that the legal provisions that govern central bank action differ substantially from the way that the banks actually operate. In particular, he distinguishes the legal term of office of the central bank governor from the actually observed turnover. The latter variable would be more closely related to bank performance (and hence to inflation), but cannot be treated as exogenous to growth or omitted third variables. Thus, for the purpose of constructing instruments for inflation, the preferred strategy is to focus on the extent to which inflation can be explained by differences in legal provisions for the central bank. Table D runs correspondingly from 0 to 1. See Table A correlation between the two variables is essentially zero. This verdict is also maintained if one looks separately over the three decades from the 1960s to the 1980s and if one holds constant other possible determinants of inflation. In this broad sample of countries, differences in legal provisions that ought to affect central bank independence have no explanatory power for inflation. (1) This negative finding is of considerable interest-it suggests that low inflation cannot be attained merely by instituting legal changes that appear to promote a more independent central bank. However, the result also means that we have to search further for instruments to clarify the relation between growth and inflation. (2) 
Lagged inflation
Earlier values of a country's inflation rate have substantial explanatory power for inflation. Lagged inflation would also be exogenous with respect to innovations in subsequent growth rates. Hence, if lagged inflation is used as an instrument, then the estimated relation between growth and inflation would not tend to reflect the short-run reverse effect of growth on inflation.
One problem, however, is that lagged inflation would reflect persistent characteristics of a country's monetary institutions (such as the extent to which policy-makers have credibility), and these characteristics could be correlated with omitted variables that are relevant to growth (such as the extent to which political institutions support the maintenance of property rights). The use of lagged inflation as an instrument would therefore not rule out the problems of interpretation that derive from omitted third variables. However, the inclusion of the other explanatory variables in the regression framework lessens this problem. (3) Section B of Table C shows the estimated effect of inflation on the growth rate when lagged inflation (over the five years prior to each sample period) is used as an instrument. The estimated coefficient is -0.020, similar to that found in Section A when actual inflation is used in the estimation. Thus, it seems that most of the estimated negative relation between growth and inflation does not represent reverse short-term effects of growth on inflation. It remains true, however, that the significant negative influence of inflation on growth shows up only for high inflation rates; the relation is insignificant if the sample is limited to rates below 10% per year. (4) Results about the variability of inflation are also similar to those found before. If the standard deviation of inflation is included in the regressions (and a lag of this standard deviation is used as an instrument), then the estimated coefficient on average inflation changes little, and the estimated effect of the standard deviation of inflation is still around zero.
Prior colonial status
Another possible instrument for inflation comes from the observation that prior colonial status has substantial explanatory power for inflation. Table E breaks down averages of inflation rates from 1960 to 1990 by groups of countries classified as non-colonies (defined as those that were independent prior to US independence in 1776) and former colonies of Britain, France, Spain or Portugal, and other countries (in this sample, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States). Table E indicates that the average inflation rate for all 117 countries from 1960 to 1990 is 12.6% per year. The average for the 30 non-colonies of 8.9% is similar to that of 10.4% for the 42 British colonies and 6.6% for the 20 French colonies. However, the rates are strikingly higher for the 18 Spanish or Portuguese colonies-29.4%-and somewhat higher for the seven other colonies-16.1%.
A key reason for the low average inflation rate for the former French colonies is the participation of most of the sub-Saharan African states in the fixed-exchange rate regime of the CFA franc. (5) This type of reasonably exogenous commitment to relatively low inflation is exactly the kind of experiment that provides for a good instrument for inflation. (a) The numbers in italics are the numbers of countries with available data that fall into each category. See Table A for a discussion of the inflation data. Countries that were independent before 1776 are treated as non-colonies. Otherwise, the colonial status refers to the most recent outside power; for example, the Philippines is attributed to the United States, rather than Spain; Rwanda and Burundi are attributed to Belgium, rather than Germany; and the Dominican Republic is attributed to France, rather than Spain. Some countries that were dominated by other countries for some periods are treated as non-colonies; examples are Hungary, Poland, South Korea and Taiwan. The only present colony in the sample is Hong Kong. The last column refers to countries that are located in Latin America but are not former Spanish or Portuguese colonies.
(1) Cukierman's (1992, Chapter 20) results concur with this finding, especially for samples that go beyond a small number of developed countries, the kind of sample used in most of the literature on central bank independence. (2) Cukierman et al (1993) use as instruments the turnover rate of bank governors and the average number of changes in bank leadership that occur within six months of a change in government. These measures of actual bank independence have substantial explanatory power for inflation but need not be exogenous with respect to growth. (3) Another favourable factor is that the residuals from the growth equations turn out not to be significantly correlated over time within countries. (4) The estimated coefficients of inflation are again stable over the three time periods. A scatter plot of the unexplained part of the growth rate against the inflation rate is virtually the same as that shown in Chart 10. However, the line drawn through the points differs somewhat from that shown in the chart (the least-squares line) when lagged inflation is used as an instrument. (5) For discussions of the CFA franc zone, see Boughton (1991) and Clement (1994) For many of the former British colonies, a significant element may be their prior experience with British-organised currency boards, another system that tends to generate low inflation [see Schwartz (1993) ]. These boards involved, at one time or another before independence, most of the British colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, south east Asia and the Middle East.
The high average inflation rate for the 16 former Spanish colonies in the sample does not reflect per se their presence in Latin America. For seven Latin American countries that are not former Spanish or Portuguese colonies, (1) the average inflation rate for 1960-90 is only 9.0%, virtually the same as that for the non-colonies (see Table E ). Also, four former Portuguese colonies in Africa experienced the relatively high average inflation rate of around 20%. (2) For Portugal and Spain themselves, the average inflation rate of 10.9% for 1960-90 is well below the rate of 29.4% experienced by their former colonies. However, 10.9% inflation is substantially higher than that experienced by France (6.4%) and the United Kingdom (7.7%).
Section C of Table E shows the estimated effect of inflation on the growth rate of GDP when prior colonial status is used as an instrument. (3) The estimated coefficient is now -0.031, somewhat higher in magnitude than that found when actual inflation is used in the estimation. The significant negative relation again arises only for high inflation rates; the relation is insignificant if the sample is limited to rates below 10% per year. (4) One question about the procedure is whether prior colonial status works in the growth regressions because it serves as an imperfect proxy for Latin America, a region that is known to have experienced surprisingly weak economic growth [see, for example, the results in Barro (1991) ]. However, if a dummy variable for Latin America is included in the system (and prior colonial status is retained as an instrument), then the estimated coefficient of inflation remains negative and significant: it becomes -0.025, essentially the same as that found when actual inflation is used in the estimation (Section A of Table C) . (5) Thus, the negative effect of inflation on growth does not reflect the tendency for many high-inflation countries to be in Latin America.
Estimated effects of inflation on investment
A likely channel by which inflation decreases growth is through a reduction in the propensity to invest. I have investigated the determination of the ratio of investment to GDP within a framework that parallels the one set out in Table B . The results for the effects of inflation are in Table F (see the notes to the table for a discussion of the other determinants of investment).
In the case of the investment ratio, the use of instruments turns out to be crucial for isolating a negative effect of inflation. Specifically, the procedures that use lagged inflation or prior colonial status as instruments (Sections B and C of Table F ) reveal these significantly negative effects. An increase in average inflation by ten percentage points per year is estimated to lower the investment ratio by 0.4-0.6 percentage points. In contrast, when actual inflation is used, the estimated coefficient is close to zero (Section A of the table). These results suggest that the reverse relation between investment and inflation is positive and that the instrumental procedures isolate the negative effect of inflation on investment.
Even when the instruments are used, the adverse effect on investment shows up clearly only for inflation rates above 10%-20% per year. For lower inflation rates, the estimated effect of inflation on the investment ratio tends to be negative, but not significantly different from zero. This finding accords with the results for growth rates.
Concluding observations
The bottom line from the empirical analysis is that the estimated effects of inflation on growth and investment are significantly negative when some plausible instruments are used in the statistical procedures. Thus, there is some reason to believe that the relations reflect causation from higher long-term inflation to reduced growth and investment.
It should be stressed that the clear evidence for adverse effects of inflation comes from the experiences of countries in which inflation exceeded 10%-20% per year in some
(1) The seven in the sample are Barbados, Dominican Republic (attributed to France rather than Spain; see the notes to 3) The inclusion of years since independence does not materially alter the results. Also, the number of years since independence has no explanatory power for inflation. This result may arise because the former colonies of Spain and Portugal in Latin America all attained independence at roughly the same time. Moreover, the tendency toward high inflation predates the experiences since the end of the Second World War. See Bordo and Schwartz (1994) for a discussion of inflationary propensities during the nineteenth century in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. (4) The estimated coefficients on inflation are still stable over the three time periods. A scatter plot of the unexplained part of the growth rate against the inflation rate is again virtually the same as that shown in Chart 10. The line drawn through the points differs from that shown in the chart (the least-squares line) because prior colonial status is used as an instrument. (5) This system includes the inflation rate and the Latin America dummy as explanatory variables, and includes as instruments prior colonial status and the Latin America dummy. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable is -0.0060 with a standard error of 0.0034. Thus, the effect is negative, but now only marginally significant. The results are basically the same if the Latin America dummy is added to the system in which actual inflation is used. It therefore appears that much of the estimated effect of the Latin America dummy on growth rates in previous research reflected a proxying of this dummy for high inflation. (a) The numbers in italics are standard errors for the estimated effects of inflation on the ratio of investment to GDP. The estimates come from systems that include the explanatory variables described in Table B , other than the investment ratio itself. The main findings for these explanatory variables are that the investment ratio is positively related to initial human capital and to the rule-of-law index, negatively related to government consumption, positively related to democracy at low levels of democracy and negatively related to democracy at high levels of democracy.
periods. The magnitudes of effects are also not that large; for example, an increase in the average inflation rate by ten percentage points per year is estimated to lower the growth rate of real per capita GDP by 0.2-0.3 percentage points per year.
Over long periods, however, an apparently small change in the average growth rate has dramatic effects on standards of living. For example, if the growth rate of UK GDP from 1960 to 1990 had been higher by 1.1 percentage points per year, then UK GDP in 1990 would have been the highest in the world, instead of the 15th highest. More specifically, a reduction in the growth rate by 0.2-0.3 percentage points per year (produced by ten percentage points more of average inflation) means that the level of real gross domestic product would be lowered after 30 years by 4%-7%. (1) In 1994, the UK gross domestic product was £670 billion; 4%-7% of this amount equals the substantial sum of £27-47 billion, more than enough to justify the Bank of England's keen interest in price stability.
(1) In the model, the fall in the growth rate by 0.2%-0.3% per year applies on impact in response to a permanent increase in the inflation rate. The growth rate would also decrease for a long time thereafter, but the magnitude of this decrease diminishes toward zero as the economy converges back to its (unchanged) long-run growth rate. Hence, in the very long run, the effect of higher inflation is a permanently lower level of output, not a reduced growth rate. The numerical estimates for the reduced level of output after 30 years take account of these dynamic effects. The calculation depends on the economy's rate of convergence to its long-term growth rate (assumed, based on the cross-country evidence, to be 2%-3% per year).
